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ABSTRACT 
 
This research presented here mainly focuses on analyzing investors’ reactions toward 
banks’ announcement of TARP repayment. Considering huge difference among sample 
banks, I split the result of abnormal return into subgroups based on banks size and 
financial performance. And then I conduct comparisons of each group to reveal the 
possible effects on market reactions casted by size and financial performance. To confirm 
my results on market reactions to TARP repayment, I perform two regression analyses on 
both full sample and subsample with cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as dependent 
variable and controlled variables as independent variables.  Data over the period from 
2008Q4 to 2013Q4 for 196 and 175 U.S. public banks and bank holding companies is 
derived from ProPublica website, CRSP data base and COMPSTAT data base. Market 
model is used to calculate cumulative abnormal return and the OLS method is adopted to 
run regression. In the end, I find that comparatively larger banks with relatively better 
accounting performance and relatively higher capital ratios are inclined to make multiple 
repayments while the comparatively smaller banks with relatively worse accounting 
performance and relatively worse capital ratios are inclined to pay back loans all at once. 
Also, I find that investors react positively to news on TARP repayments. Especially, 
splitting the sample by various possible determinants for CARs, I find that stock market 
investors remain less optimistic about comparatively larger banks with relatively better 
accounting performance and relatively higher capital ratios than the comparatively 
smaller banks with relatively worse accounting performance and relatively worse capital 
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ratios. I suggest that small and struggled companies have more potential to develop after 
exiting TARP.  
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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This paper applies event study to analyze market reactions to banks that fully or partially 
repaid the U.S. Treasury’s investments in the Trouble Assets Relief Program (also known 
as TARP). TARP was created out of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) 
of 2008, which was designed in response to the subprime mortgage crisis and signed into 
law by President George W. Bush. The act originally authorized the U.S. Treasury 
Secretary to infuse $700 billion into U.S. economy through purchasing distressed assets 
from banks and other firms. Among many programs in TARP, the Targeted Investment 
Program (TIP) and the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) are specific to banks and bank 
holding companies. Those two programs were aimed to strengthen the capital base for 
those who were generously healthy but suffered from liquidity or financial problems due 
to the crisis. Specifically, CPP proposed to inject $250 billion yet, by the program’s close 
on December 9, 2009, the expenditure was 45 billion less than it initial goal. There were 
709 financial institutions including 707 commercial banks and bank holding companies 
involved in it. Among those recipients, 282 are publicly traded. Two banks that 
participated in the CPP also received capital infusions of $20 billion each from the 
Targeted Investment Program (TIP). These banks were Citigroup and Bank of America. 
Both CPP and TIP infused capital through publicly trading preferred stocks and warrants. 
In CPP, the loans recipients agreed to pay a dividend of five percent for the first five 
years and nine percent thereafter to their preferred stock holders. And warrants, which 
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were attached to 15 percent of the investment and had a strike price based on the 20 day 
trailing stock price, allowed the owners to purchase newly issued stock at a preset strike 
or exercise price on or before the expiration date. In TIP, the loans recipients were 
required to pay 8 percent dividends on preferred stocks. And warrants were attached to 
10 percent of the investment and had a strike price based on the 20 day trailing stock 
price. On February 17, 2009, President Barack Obama signed The American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which changed the terms of TARP. This act made TARP 
less attractive to many banks and enabled banks to drop out the TARP program early as 
well. The ARRA’s Title VII placed restrictions on executive payments by recipients of 
TARP funds. This act reduced the attractiveness of TARP for banks. Meanwhile, Title 
VII, Section 7001(g) of the ARRA allowed recipients to repay their funds much earlier 
than the original CPP contracts. In the original CPP contracts, banks were not permitted 
to redeem their preferred stock immediately and instead they generally had to wait three 
years after the initial capital injection before they could completely call back the 
preferred stock. Yet, the ARRA allowed banks to exit CPP immediately if they could 
issue new equity equal to or in excess of the U.S. Treasury’s investment.  As for banks 
that wanted to exit TARP, the amount and timing of their repayments was subject to 
consultation with the appropriate federal banking agency. If the agency confirmed that a 
bank would have sufficient capital after repayment, the bank could pay back the entire 
CPP investment either in a lump sum or over time, as long as each payment was at least 
25% of the original total investment (unless the last payment was less by default). When 
returning the CPP investment, banks also had the opportunity to repurchase the warrants 
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received by the Treasury at warrants’ fair market value. At the end of March 2009, four 
bank holding companies firstly announced their full CPP repayments. In December 2009, 
right after banks were allowed to exit TIP, Citi Bank and Bank of America repaid their 
loans in full. By the end of 2013, a total of 208 publicly traded banks completely or 
partially repaid the investments they had received under TARP. Repayments from 
publicly held banks totaled approximately $222 billion out of $232 billion received.  
 
In this research, I utilize the market model over the period 2008Q4-2013Q4 to calculate 
abnormal return for 196 banks in the full sample and 175 banks in the subsample. I split 
the result of abnormal return into subgroups based on banks size and financial 
performance. Then I conduct a comparison analysis to reveal the possible effects on 
market reactions by size and financial performance. To confirm my results on market 
reactions to TARP repayment, I conduct regressions on two subsamples with cumulative 
abnormal return as dependent variable and other variables as right-hand-side variables.  
 
I find that comparatively larger banks with relatively better accounting performance and 
relatively higher capital ratios are inclined to make multiple repayments while the 
comparatively smaller banks with relatively worse accounting performance and relatively 
worse capital ratios are intended to pay back loans in full. Also, I find that investors react 
positively to news on TARP repayments. Especially, splitting the sample by various 
possible determinants for CARs, I find that stock market investors remain less optimistic 
about comparatively larger banks with relatively better accounting performance and 
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relatively higher capital ratios than the comparatively smaller banks with relatively worse 
accounting performance and relatively worse capital ratios. I suggest that small and 
struggled companies have more potential to develop after exiting TARP.  
1.2 Organization 
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I review previous’ 
researches focusing on TARP. In section 3, I introduce the process of data collection. I 
describe the methodology in section 4.  In Section 5, I provide the results of this research. 
In section 6, I present the conclusion and summary of the results described.  
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SECTION 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this sector, my purpose is to give a comprehensive overview of important findings of 
previous studies. Because TARP may will be the largest government intervention in 
banking since the Great Depression, related researches has attracted considerable 
attentions. Most of this research addresses which banks enter or are selected for TARP. 
Bayazitova and Shivdassani (2009) explored the basic characteristics of banks that 
received capital investment by separately conducting regression in three distinctive 
decision making processes (banks’ application submission decision, the U.S. Treasury’s 
approval decision and banks’ rejection decision). They concluded that compared to other 
banks involved in TARP, banks that were larger in size, had derivatives exposures, 
weaker capital ratios and unstable funding profiles, were more exposed to systemic risk, 
and had significantly stronger asset quality. Taliaferro (2009) reached similar result by 
investigating the characteristics of the CPP participants from the angel of their target 
capital structures. This study found that banks with high leverage and facing a high cost 
of a regulatory downgrade were more likely to involve in CPP, as were banks with 
likelihood to increase lending. Aside from banks’ characteristics, their political 
connections also raised massive attentions among scholars studying factors influence 
TARP allocation. Contrary to Bayazitova and Shivdassani (2009) who found no 
connection between political connections and Treasury’s decisions, Duchin and Sosyura 
(2010) argued that banks’ political connections cast a strong effect on their access to 
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government capital. Li (2010) included banks’ campaign contributions, committee 
assignments, ideology and connections with the Federal Reserve System as potential 
TARP distribution factors in his study. He found that apart from ideology, the other three 
political factors had significant effect on TARP distribution. Another possible factor 
considered as critical for TARP participation by many scholars was CEO compensation 
limitations. Bayazitova and Shivdassani (2009) believed that the restrictions over 
executive salary in H.R.1586 played an important role in the capital infusion process and 
they considered it as an associated political interference cost of TARP. Cadman et al. 
(2010) found that banks with higher levels of CEO pay were more likely to reject TARP 
funds.  
The other major stream of literature on TARP has focused on market reactions to the 
announcement of TARP. Duchin and Sosyura (2009) found that banks experienced 
significant valuation gains only when the government announced the TARP instead when 
the U.S. Treasury announced selection decisions and when bank announced its respond to 
Treasury’s decision. Kim (2010) observed negative market reactions to banks making 
announcement to restrict CEOs’ payments, especially for those larger size and better 
performing banks. Elyasiani, Mester and Pagano (2013) investigated investors’ reactions 
to financial instructions’ announcements of capital infusions through TARP injections. 
They found that investors reacted positively to TARP. Investors’ reactions to TARP were 
significantly related to the bank’s prior financial condition including profitability, 
capitalization, and size. Bayazitova and Shivdassani (2009) found no negative 
information about financial health of banks associated with TARP capital infusion.  
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Aside from focusing on initial distribution, several empirical studies have evaluated the 
effects of TARP on bank lending, capital adequacy and bank risk taking. Examples 
include Philippon and Schnabl (2009), Wilson (2009), Wilson and Wu (2010), Li (2010), 
Taliaferro (2009) and Black and Hazelwood (2012). Some of them claimed that the 
TARP investment did induce additional lending. Others argued that most of the TARP 
funds were used to fill capital holes, as opposed to supporting new lending. 
However, currently there is very limited literature that discovers banks’ TARP repayment; 
though more than 90 percent of infusion funds have been repaid. Bayazitova and 
Shivdassani (2009) indicated that banks which repaid CPP infusions tended to be larger, 
have stronger capital ratios, and better asset quality than banks that continued to receive 
TARP support. Besides, they focused that executive compensation as a strong 
determinant of whether a bank repays TARP funds. In addition, they also found that on 
average TARP repayments were associated with significantly positive announcement 
returns in 2009. Wilson and Wu (2010) investigated the characteristics of the banks that 
fully or partially repaid TARP. They found that larger banks that raised private capital in 
2009, banks that had better earnings performance in 2008, and banks that have fewer 
problem assets are significantly more likely to have exited TARP early. Also, CEO pay 
restrictions associated with TARP investments have often been reasons cited for why 
banks paid back government capital early. Li and Tehranian investigated how the pre-
crisis health of banks is related to the probability of repaying, or missing a dividend 
payment on TARP funds. They concluded that repaying banks are those that see 
performance improvements during the time they hold TARP funds and that all banks 
  
 8  
 
involved in TARP have liquidity problems. Although Bayazitova and Shivdassani (2009) 
even applied event study on repayment decision of CPP during 2009 and they found 
overall positive market reactions to this decision, for the reasons of limited time periods, 
incomplete data and unsatisfied outcomes, investors’ reactions to banks repayment 
decisions need to be fully explored 
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SECTION 3 
Data 
3.1 Sample selection 
By February 2014, 515 out of 758 the TARP involved banks have fully or partially repaid 
the funds and another 145 banks are required to pay back in the future. Indeed, as 
discussed in section 2, as the TARP program progressed many banks realized that the 
costs of participating in TARP were higher than had been expected and decided to pay 
back loans from government. I cumulate detailed information about TARP recipients 
including the amount of committed and returned funds, warrants, and dividends interest 
as well as the date of TARP entry and exit from the website called ProPublica
1
, which is 
a non-profit journalism site that tracks TARP recipients. 
Among all those non-failed banks, I include only commercial banks and bank holding 
companies traded publicly through exchanges and with accessible stock price data in this 
study. After deleting private banks, acquired banks, OTC-traded banks or community 
development banks and banks with missing important information, the sample size is 
narrowed to 196 for all available banks and 175 for banks with one repayment only. 
Among them, for those banks experienced mergers, their daily stock return data might 
incomplete after mergers. Yet I still keep them in the sample as long as their mergers 
happened after repayments were announced enough data to calculate abnormal returns. 
To predict and analyze market reactions, I collect banks’ daily stock market return data 
and overall market returns (CRSP value-weighted return) data from 2008 Q4 to 2013 Q4 
                                                 
1
 ProPublica’ website: http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list/category/Bank 
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from CRSP. Although the TARP nominally target on relatively healthy banks, its 
recipients are various in size and their financial performance, especially after May 13, 
2009 when Secretary Geithner announced that the Treasury planned to reopen the 
application window for participation in the CPP for banks with total assets under $500 
million. Besides, the difference between banks and bank holding company is quite large 
so that might attract different market reactions.  
Taking all those factors in consideration, I decide to separately analyze market reactions 
to each bank according to bank’s performance and financial characteristics. To meet this 
goal, I collect Banks’ quarterly financial data between 2008Q4 and 2013Q4 from 
COMPASTAT. Considering data consistency, I use uniformed company’s CUSIP codes 
to match them together. And then I segregate the data according to different 
characteristics in general. Following Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and 
Federal Reserve guidelines, I divide banks into five size groups based on quarter-end 
2008Q4 book value of assets: i) less than $500 million; ii) between $500 million and $1 
billion; iii) between $1 billion and $3 billion; iv) between $3 billion and $10 billion; and 
v) greater than $10 billion. Besides, I also separate banks based on frequencies of their 
repayments. Specifically, I define "one-time-only-banks" as those banks that repaid loans 
once in full and "multiple-times-banks" as banks that make multiple repayments in 
research period. 
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3.2 Event date 
I use the day when banks announced their TARP repayment as the event day.Yet, It is 
impossible to use their TARP repayment announcement date as the event date for banks 
experience mergers and repayments at the same day or in the day after. Hence, I adjust 
the event day to the first day when the merger announcement is made, which covers 
detailed TARP repayment plan. Besides, since my study is based on daily stock data, I 
employ a 3-day event window (-1, +1) around the event date as an adjustment to 
information leaking or lagging. In addition, I utilize the 143 trading day period (around 
six month) prior to the event window as the estimation window, which maintained data 
sufficiency and reduced overlap bias as well. 
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SECTION 4 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Abnormal Returns 
I use classic market model to estimate abnormal returns for the 3-day event window 
around each event date. The models are as follows: 
Rit’=αi+βiRmt’ +εit’ 
E(εit’)=0  Var(εit’)= σεit’
2
 
Where Rit’ is the daily stock logarithm return
2 for a bank i at time t’ (t’ belongs to each 
estimation window), Rmt’ is the daily market logarithm return (CRSP value-weighted 
return) at time t’ and εit’ is an unobserved error term. Generally, ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method that I adopt is a common regression method to estimate the market model 
parameters.  
ARit= Rit-E(Rit)= Rit -
^ 
αi-
^ 
βiRmt 
Where ARit is the abnormal return (logarithm form) for a bank i at time t (t belongs to 
event window). E(Rit) is expected return (logarithm form) estimated by the market model. 
αi and βi are coefficients estimated by the market model.  
Since it is important to make overall inference for the event of interest, the abnormal 
return should be aggregated. The aggregation is along two dimensions which are over 
time and beyond security. I decide to contemplate aggregation over time first. Hence, 
after calculating abnormal return for each firm, I compute three-day window (-1, 1) 
                                                 
2
 Rit’=log(1+r it’)=log(
    
    
)=log(rit2)-log(rit1) 
∑            
 
  
=log(1+rit1)+ log(1+rit2)+……+ log(1+ritn)=log(pn)-log(p0) 
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cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for every sample firm. 
CARi(t1,t2)=∑ AR
  
 =  it 
CARi(-1, 1)= ∑ AR  =− it 
Var (CAR(-1,1))= (t2-t1+1)σ i
2 
After aggregate abnormal return across different time period, it is time to cumulate it in 
the other dimension (through various securities). So, I calculate average cumulative 
abnormal return (ACAR). 
ACAR(t1,t2)=
 
N
∑ CAR  = i(t1,t2) 
ACAR(-1,1)=
 
N
∑ CAR𝑁 = i(-1,1) 
Var (ACAR(-1,1))=𝑥 =
 
N2
∑ σ𝑁 = i
2 
Under the null hypothesis (H0) that the event of interest casts no effect on the real returns, 
the distribution of the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) is 
ACAR(-1,1)~N(0, Var (ACAR(-1,1))) 
Given the null distribution of ACAR, tests of null hypothesis can be conducted. I conduct 
t-tests to determine whether ACAR is significantly different from zero. 
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4.2 Comparison Analysis 
In many situations, market reaction to the same event can be different among different 
companies. Hence, considering sample banks are various in sizes, financial 
characteristics and operating performances, I separate the sample into subgroups and 
conduct descriptive analysis and calculate ACAR for each group. The accounting based 
measures are as follows. Tier 1 capital ratio indicates the banks’ capital adequacy. 
Liquidity ratio indicates the banks’ current and contingent cash position. Return on assets 
indicates how profitable the banks are. Nonperforming asset to total assets and Provisions 
for loan losses to total asset indicates the banks’ loan composition and performance.Net-
charge offs to total assets indicates the banks’ bad debts composition and the recovery 
performance, Common shares issued to total assets indicates the amount of banks’ new 
issued common shares regarding to their total assets. Repayment amount to total assets 
indicates the banks’ TARP repayments proportion of total assets，Merger indicates 
whether banks have gone through merger, Pay all indicates the probability of the banks 
having repaid all TARP loans during the research period. 
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4.3 Regression Analysis 
In order to confirm and explore about results from the event studies in the previous 
section, I conduct the following regressions using each bank's quarterly CAR as a 
dependent variable and using several financial performing factors that can influence 
market reactions as independent variables. 
CARi=α+β1 Tier 1 capital ratio +β2 Liquidity ratio +β3 Return on assets +β4Ln(Total 
Assets)+β5Net Charge-offs to total assets+β6 Nonperforming asset to total assets +β7 
Provisions for loan to total asset +β8 Common share issued to total assets +β9 Merger+β10 
Repayment amount to total assets +ε 
Where CARi is quarterly CAR of bank I, Tier 1 capital ratio is Risk-adjusted tier 1 capital 
divided by total assets, Liquidity ratio is Cash and short-term investment divided by total 
assets, Return on assets is Net income after tax divided by total assets, Ln(Total Assets) is 
the natural logarithm of total assets, Net Charge-offs to total assets is the reported amount 
of asset write-downs minus recoveries of previous write downs and then divided by total 
assets, Nonperforming asset to total assets is loans and other assets that are 90 days or 
greater past due divided by total assets, Provisions for loan to total asset is the charged 
against earnings to establish a reserve sufficient to  absorb expected loan losses based 
upon knowledge of the loan portfolio divided by total assets, Common share issued to 
total assets is bank’s common share issued divided by total assets, Merger is a dummy 
variable indicate whether the bank has gone through mergers, Repayment amount to total 
assets is the amount of TARP repayment normalized by the asset in order to avoid the 
size effect. 
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SECTION 5 
RESULTS 
5.1 Distribution results 
Table 1 shows the detail information about the sample banks’ TARP entrance and exit 
between 2008Q4 to2013Q4. Specifically, according to figure1, which demonstrates the 
distribution of TARP issuance by frequency, 134 out of 196 the sample banks enter in the 
TARP in 2008Q4, which is the first and largest TARP entrance period. The next peak for 
TARP entrance is 2009Q1 when 57 banks announce to receive the loans from the U.S. 
Treasury. By the CPP closed on December 31, 2009, only 5 banks join the program. 
Among of them, 3 banks enroll after the CPP reopened on May 13 2009. Similarly, from 
figure 2, which tracks the distribution of TARP issuance by amount, it is obvious that 
most of the TARP funds are distributed in 2008Q4 and a relatively small amount of loans 
distributed from 2009Q2 to 2009Q4. Yet, unlike figure 1, no significant amount of loan is 
issued in 2009Q1, though many banks entered the TARP at that time. 
Figure 3 and 4 vividly demonstrate the distribution of the TARP repayments by the 
sample banks. The start of the TARP exit is in 2009Q1. After ARRA signed into law in 
February 2009, four bank holding companies (Marin Bancorp., Iberiabank Corp., Old 
National Bancorp., and Signature Bank) announce their full repayment on March 31 2009. 
According to figure 3, more banks, 33 out of 175, repay their loans in 2011Q3 than any 
other quarters. Meanwhile, based on of U.S. Treasury’s tracker3, a total of 45 institutions 
repurchase all or part of their outstanding CPP preferred shares in August 2011. However, 
                                                 
3
 U.S. Treasury TARP tracker: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/TARP-
Tracker.aspx 
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in figure 4 which tracks the distribution of TARP repayment by amount, the total amount 
of TARP repayments in this period is not particularly large. The second peak of TARP 
repayments is 2009Q2, which has 22 banks paying back. During this period, ten of the 
largest banks in TARP’s CPP are approved and pay back $68 billion loans, according to 
U.S. Treasury. Similarly, figure 4 shows this quarter has the second largest amount of 
money returned. The third and fourth peaks in figure 3 are 2012Q2 and 2009Q4. 
Comparison with figure 4 shows that only 2009Q4 has a significant amount of money 
returned. In December 2009, all of the TIP funds were returned according U.S. 
Treasury’s TARP tracker. Banks not completely paying back their loans by 2009Q4 
would be subject to the executive compensation restrictions in 2010.  
5.2 Descriptive statistics results 
Table 3 displays the characteristics of both “one-time-only-banks” and “multiple-times-
banks”. Generally, the total assets of both groups are highly skewed. The median values 
of total assets are $2.21 billion and $2.58 billion. Yet, the average values of total assets 
are $55.00 billion and $99.17 billion in assets. In this case the average values are ten 
times bigger than the median values.  The mean and median of the natural logarithm of 
assets are similar indication that the skewness of assets is consistent with a log normal 
distribution at least in this aspect. Besides, repayment amount to total assets of both 
groups are highly skewed as well. The median bank of each group in the sample has 1.66% 
and 1.78% in this ratio. Yet, the average bank of each group has 97.72% and 5.24% 
separately in this ratio. Specifically, compared to “multiple-times-banks”, “one-time-
only-banks” has less total assets, slightly less profitability as measured by return on assets, 
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slightly lower capital adequacy as measured by the risk adjusted tier 1 capital ratios, 
slightly higher current and contingent cash position capital adequacy as measured by the 
liquidity ratios, slightly higher loan proportion in assets as measured by nonperforming 
asset to total assets ratios, slightly less performance of recovery bad debts, and last but 
not least higher amount of repayment as measured by repayment amount to total assets an. 
However, “one-time-only-banks” shares huge difference on total assets with “multiple-
times-banks” and most of control variables are based on total assets. Hence, aside from 
difference on total assets between two groups, only differences on nonperforming assets 
to total assets, difference on repayment amount to total assets and difference one merger 
should be taken into consideration. Thus, I conclude that banks in group of “one-time-
only-banks” are relatively smaller, bearing more amounts of loan, with more amounts of 
repayment and probability of going through a merger than “multiple-times-banks”. 
5.3 Event study results 
Table4 shows the descriptive statistics of cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for “one-
time-only-banks” and “multiple-times-banks”. Generally, stock market investors react 
positively to bank’s TARP repayment announcement. Possible explanations might be that 
the approval of exiting TARP conveys positive information about the financial health of 
the banks or that getting rid of restrictions on CEO’s compensations avoids top talents 
drift. This result is consistent with the view of Bayazitova and Shivdassani (2009)
4
. 
Besides, the CAR is highly skewed. In addition, compared with “multiple-times-banks”, 
“one-time-only-banks” have slightly higher CAR and standard deviation of CAR. Thus, 
                                                 
4
 Bayazitova and Shivdassani also detect positive market reactions to banks’ TARP repayments even 
though they believe the initial capital injection does not appear to contain a certification effect. 
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banks with only one TARP repayment in research period get a larger positive market 
reaction than banks with multiple TARP repayment. Yet, the different between two 
groups is not significant though. 
Table 5 reports the comparison analysis results of average cumulative abnormal return 
(ACAR). As for “one-time-only-banks”, all of ACARs under each control variable are 
positive and significantly different than zero. Thus, stock market investors reacted 
positively to “one-time-only-banks” TARP repayment announcement. However, banks 
from “multiple-times-banks” have negative ACAR values under several control variables 
and all of the significant t tests are failed. Those negative ACAR values might be related 
to small sample size and hence cannot change the result that investors react positively to 
both “one-time-only-banks” and “multiple-times-banks". In fact, those negative ACAR 
reveal that controlled variables have different effect on market reactions for “one-time-
only-banks” and “multiple-times-banks”. Among most of vertical control variables, “one-
time-only-banks” have slightly higher ACAR than “multiple-banks”. This fact consists 
with the statistical result on CAR in table 4. In vertical comparison, “one-time-only-
banks” with relatively more nonperforming assets, lower liquidity level, more provisions 
for loans, more net charge offs and more merger or acquisition actions get more 
optimistic market reactions than the counterpart. “Multiple-times-banks” with relatively 
higher total assets, higher returns on assets, higher tier 1 capital ratio get more optimistic 
market reactions than the counterpart. Thus, for “one-time-only-banks”, stock market 
investors remain less optimistic about comparatively larger banks with relatively better 
accounting performance and relatively higher capital ratios than the comparatively 
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smaller banks with relatively worse accounting performance and relatively worse capital 
ratios. This result appears to be confusing but sensible on a second thought. It is well 
known that stock price doesn't only reflect a company's current value but also reflects the 
growth that investors expect in the future. To pay back TARP loans and therefore to 
avoid higher dividend rate, most of those struggled small companies choose to merger 
with other banks to gain both geographic and economic improvement. Those acts of 
struggle to survive and to turn a year-end report from red to black are more promising in 
investors’ eye than acts are undertaken by well-performed banks to just avoid intense 
public scrutiny.
5
 However, for “multiple-times-banks”, stock market investors remain 
more optimistic about comparatively larger banks with relatively better accounting 
performance and relatively higher capital ratios than the comparatively smaller banks 
with relatively worse accounting performance and relatively worse capital ratios.  Besides, 
although new common share issuing conveyed positive information about banks capital 
capacity and met ARRA requirement, it will dilute current shares’ value which investors 
are holding as well. Hence, investors reacted more positively to banks (both “one-time-
only-banks” and “multiple-times-banks”) with less new issued common shares.  
5.4 Regression results 
Table 6 displays the result of regression analysis that I conduct to confirm the results 
from the event studies in the previous section. In this table, all the signs in both models 
are consistent with the results from the event studies. Other than that, both models are not 
estimated well with little R square and most of coefficients are insignificant. And that 
                                                 
5
 Explanations based on few journalism reviews. 
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might help to explain those confusing information conveyed by models’ coefficients and 
reveal the limits of this research. Firstly, the valuation impact and explanation power of 
repaying CPP infusions might be underestimated due to substantial media and equity 
analyst focus and speculation about the possibility of redemption. For instance, in a 
highly publicized research report release on March 11, 2009 Goldman Sachs predicted 
eight banks would repay TARP capital, which are around 3 to more than 12 months 
before the official announcement came out. In this case, those cumulative abnormal 
returns calculated by a 3-day event window might not precisely reveal the real market 
reaction to this event. Meanwhile, market investors might use financial performance data 
on different quarter rather than what I used in this research. 
Last but not least, limits on data availability might also contribute to results insignificant 
and poor explanation power. The sample in this research only covers 196 banks, which is 
a relatively insufficient to predict and estimate reactions in excessive violent stock market. 
Besides, one of the data sources of this research (COMPASTAT) only covers few 
quarterly financial data under general categories. Those specific data from bank and 
financial institution focused categories are unavailable for me. In the end, group of “one-
time-only-banks” has 175 banks but group of “multiple-times-banks” has 21 banks. The 
huge group size different might decrease the power of comparison results.  Hence, I 
cannot find enough control variables to precisely explain the market reactions. 
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SECTION 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
I use 196 TARP recipients that have fully or partially repaid the funds as the full sample. 
Among them, 175 TARP recipients are in full and other 21 TARP recipients are with 
multiple repayments. From my research, I find that comparatively larger banks with 
relatively better accounting performance and relatively higher capital ratios are inclined 
to make multiple repayments while the comparatively smaller banks with relatively 
worse accounting performance and relatively worse capital ratios are intended to pay 
back loans all at once. Also, I find that investors react positively to news on TARP 
repayments. Possibly, investors treat TARP exit as a positive signal on the banks’ 
financial health or as a relief from restrictions on CEO’s compensations and from top 
talents drift. From this point, positive reactions from investors are reasonable. Especially, 
splitting the sample by various possible determinants for CARs, I find small market 
reactions for comparatively larger banks with relatively better accounting performance 
and relatively higher capital ratios than the comparatively smaller banks with relatively 
worse accounting performance and relatively worse capital ratios. I suggest that small 
and struggled companies have more potential to develop after exiting TARP. To pay back 
TARP loans and therefore to avoid higher dividend rate, most of those struggled small 
companies chose to merger with other banks to gain both geographic and economic 
improvement. Hence, a more positive market reaction to small and struggled banks’ 
TARP exit is quite reasonable as well. 
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Table 1. Sample firms 
 
Name Disbursed 
Date 
Disbursed 
Amount 
Returned 
Date 
Returned 
Amount 
1st Constitution Bancorp 12/23/2008 12000000 10/27/2010 12000000 
1st Source Corp 01/23/2009 111000000 12/29/2010 111000000 
Alliance Financial Corp 12/19/2008 26918000 05/13/2009 26918000 
Ameris Bancorp 11/21/2008 52000000 06/13/2012 47665332 
AmeriServ Financial 12/19/2008 21000000 08/11/2011 21000000 
Annapolis Bancorp 01/30/2009 8152000 04/18/2012 4076000 
Associated Banc-Corp 11/21/2008 525000000 04/06/2011 8152000 
Bancorp Rhode Island 12/19/2008 30000000 08/05/2009 525000000 
BancTrust Financial Group 12/19/2008 50000000 05/29/2012 50000000 
Bank of America 10/28/2008 45000000000 12/09/2009 45000000000 
Bank of Commerce Holdings 11/14/2008 17000000 09/27/2011 17000000 
Bank of Marin Bancorp 12/05/2008 28000000 03/31/2009 28000000 
Bank of New York Mellon 10/28/2008 3000000000 06/09/2009 3000000000 
Bank of North Carolina 12/05/2008 31260000 08/23/2012 28365685 
Bank of the Ozarks 12/12/2008 75000000 11/04/2009 75000000 
Banner Corp 11/21/2008 124000000 03/28/2012 108071915 
Bar Harbor Bankshares 01/16/2009 18751000 02/24/2010 18751000 
BB&T 11/14/2008 3133640000 06/09/2009 3133640000 
BCSB Bancorp 12/23/2008 10800000 01/26/2011 10800000 
Berkshire Hills Bancorp 12/19/2008 40000000 05/27/2009 40000000 
Boston Private Financial 
Holdings 
11/21/2008 154000000 01/10/2010 50000000 
Bridge Capital Holdings 12/23/2008 23864000 02/23/1011 23864000 
C&F Financial Corp 01/09/2009 20000000 07/27/2011 10000000 
Capital Bank 12/12/2008 41279000 01/28/2011 41279000 
Capital One Financial Corp. 11/14/2008 3555199000 12/03/2009 3555199000 
 Carolina Bank Holdings 01/09/2009 16000000 02/20/2013 14811984 
Carver Bancorp 01/16/2009 18980000 08/27/2010 18980000 
Cathay General Bancorp 12/05/2008 258000000 03/20/1013 129000000 
Center Bancorp 01/09/2009 10000000 09/15/2011 10000000 
CenterState Banks of Florida, 
Inc. 
11/21/2008 27875000 09/30/2009 27875000 
Central Bancorp 12/05/2008 10000000 09/01/2011 10000000 
Central Valley Community 
Bancorp 
01/30/2009 7000000 08/18/2011 7000000 
Citigroup 10/28/2008 45000000000 12/23/2009 20000000000 
Citizens & Northern Corporation 01/16/2009 26440000 08/04/2010 26440000 
Citizens First Corp 12/19/2008 8779000 02/16/2011 2212308 
Citizens Republic Bancorp 12/12/2008 300000000 09/13/2012 300000000 
Citizens South Banking Corp 12/12/2008 20500000 09/22/2011 20500000 
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Name Disbursed 
Date 
Disbursed 
Amount 
Returned 
Date 
Returned 
Amount 
City National 11/21/2008 400000000 12/30/2009 400000000 
CoBiz Financial 12/19/2008 64450000 09/08/2011 64450000 
Codorus Valley Bancorp 01/09/2009 16500000 08/18/2011 16500000 
Columbia Banking System 11/21/2008 76898000 08/11/2010 76898000 
Comerica Incorporated 11/14/2008 2250000000 03/17/2010 2250000000 
Community Bankers Trust Corp 12/19/2008 17680000 07/24/2013 7000000 
Community Financial Corp 12/19/2008 12643000 01/09/2013 12643000 
Community Partners Bancorp 01/30/2009 9000000 08/11/2011 9000000 
Connecticut Bank and Trust 
Company 
12/19/2008 5448000 10/25/2011 5448000 
CVB Financial 12/05/2008 130000000 09/02/2009 130000000 
Eagle Bancorp 12/05/2008 38235000 12/23/2009 15000000 
East West Bancorp, Inc. 12/05/2008 306546000 12/29/2010 306546000 
Eastern Virginia Bankshares 01/09/2009 24000000 10/18/2013 24000000 
Elmira Savings Bank 12/19/2008 9090000 08/25/2011 9090000 
Enterprise Financial Services 
Corp 
12/19/2008 35000000 11/07/2012 35000000 
F.N.B. Corporation 01/09/2009 100000000 09/09/2009 100000000 
Fidelity Bancorp, Inc. 12/12/2008 7000000 07/19/2012 7000000 
Fidelity Southern Corp 12/19/2008 48200000 06/27/2012 42757786 
Fifth Third Bancorp 12/31/2008 3408000000 02/02/2011 3408000000 
Financial Institutions 12/23/2008 37515000 02/23/2011 37515000 
First Bancorp 01/09/2009 65000000 09/01/2011 65000000 
First Busey Corporation 03/06/2009 100000000 08/25/2011 100000000 
First Capital Bancorp 04/03/2009 10958000 06/13/2012 9931327 
First Citizens Banc Corp 01/23/2009 23184000 06/27/2012 20689633 
First Community Bancshares 11/21/2008 41500000 07/08/2009 41500000 
First Community Corp 11/21/2008 11350000 08/23/2012 10987794 
First Defiance Financial Corp 12/05/2008 37000000 06/13/2012 35084144 
First Financial Bancorp 12/23/2008 80000000 02/24/2010 80000000 
First Financial Holdings 12/05/2008 65000000 03/28/2012 55926478 
First Horizon National 11/14/2008 866540000 12/22/2010 866540000 
First M&F Corp 02/27/2009 30000000 02/07/2013 30000000 
First Merchants Corp 02/20/2009 116000000 09/22/2011 116000000 
First Midwest Bancorp 12/05/2008 193000000 11/23/2011 193000000 
First Niagara 11/21/2008 184011000 05/27/2009 184011000 
First PacTrust Bancorp, Inc. 11/21/2008 19300000 12/15/2010 19300000 
Firstbank Corp 01/30/2009 33000000 06/27/2012 30587530 
FirstMerit Corp 01/09/2009 125000000 04/22/2009 125000000 
Flagstar Bancorp 01/30/2009 266657000 03/27/2013 240627277 
Flushing Financial Corp 12/19/2008 70000000 10/28/2009 70000000 
Fulton Financial Corp 12/23/2008 376500000 07/14/2010 376500000 
Goldman Sachs 10/28/2008 10000000000 06/09/2009 10000000000 
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Name Disbursed 
Date 
Disbursed 
Amount 
Returned 
Date 
Returned 
Amount 
Great Southern Bancorp 12/05/2008 58000000 08/18/2011 58000000 
Green Bankshares 12/23/2008 72278000 09/07/2011 68700000 
Guaranty Federal Bancshares 01/30/2009 17000000 06/13/2012 5000000 
Hawthorn Bancshares 12/19/2008 30255000 05/09/2012 12000000 
Heartland Financial USA 12/19/2008 81698000 09/15/2011 81698000 
Heritage Commerce Corp 11/21/2008 40000000 03/07/2012 40000000 
Heritage Financial Corp 11/21/2008 24000000 12/22/2010 24000000 
Heritage Oaks Bancorp 03/20/2009 21000000 07/17/2013 21000000 
HF Financial Corp 11/21/2008 25000000 06/03/2009 25000000 
HMN Financial 12/23/2008 26000000 02/08/2013 18571410 
Home BancShares, Inc. 01/16/2009 50000000 07/06/2011 50000000 
HopFed Bancorp 12/12/2008 18400000 12/19/2012 18400000 
Horizon Bancorp 12/19/2008 25000000 11/10/2010 6250000 
Huntington Bancshares 11/14/2008 1398071000 12/22/2010 1398071000 
IBERIABANK Corp 12/05/2008 90000000 03/31/2009 90000000 
Independent Bank Corp 01/09/2009 78158000 04/22/2009 78158000 
Independent Bank Corporation 12/12/2008 72000000 08/30/2013 72000000 
Indiana Community Bancorp 12/12/2008 21500000 09/12/2012 21500000 
International Bancshares 
Corporation 
12/23/2008 216000000 07/11/2011 216000000 
Intervest Bancshares 12/23/2008 25000000 06/24/2013 24007500 
JPMorgan Chase 10/28/2008 25000000000 06/09/2009 25000000000 
KeyCorp 11/14/2008 2500000000 03/30/2011 2500000000 
Lakeland Bancorp 02/06/2009 59000000 08/04/2010 20000000 
Lakeland Financial Corporation 02/27/2009 56044000 06/09/2010 56044000 
LNB Bancorp 12/12/2008 25223000 06/13/2012 21863750 
LSB Corp 12/12/2008 15000000 11/18/2009 15000000 
M&T Bank Corporation 12/23/2008 600000000 05/18/2011 370000000 
Mackinac Financial Corporation 04/24/2009 11000000 08/23/2012 10380905 
MainSource Financial Group 01/16/2009 57000000 03/28/2012 52277171 
MB Financial 12/05/2008 196000000 03/14/2012 196000000 
Mercantile Bank Corporation 05/15/2009 21000000 06/06/2012 21000000 
MetroCorp Bancshares 01/16/2009 45000000 06/27/2012 43490360 
Mid Penn Bancorp 12/19/2008 10000000 12/28/2012 10000000 
Middleburg Financial Corp 01/30/2009 22000000 12/23/2009 22000000 
MidSouth Bancorp 01/09/2009 20000000 08/25/2011 20000000 
MidWest One Financial Group 02/06/2009 16000000 07/06/2011 16000000 
Monarch Financial Holdings 12/19/2008 14700000 12/23/2009 14700000 
Morgan Stanley 10/28/2008 10000000000 06/09/2009 10000000000 
MutualFirst Financial 12/23/2008 32382000 08/25/2011 32382000 
Nara Bancorp 11/21/2008 67000000 06/27/2012 67000000 
National Penn Bancshares 12/12/2008 150000000 03/16/2011 150000000 
NewBridge Bancorp Bancshares 12/12/2008 52372000 04/29/2013 50837239 
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Name Disbursed 
Date 
Disbursed 
Amount 
Returned 
Date 
Returned 
Amount 
North Central Bancshares 01/09/2009 10200000 12/14/2011 10200000 
Northeast Bancorp 12/12/2008 4227000 11/28/2012 4227000 
Northern Trust 11/14/2008 1576000000 06/09/2009 1576000000 
OceanFirst Financial Corp 01/16/2009 38263000 12/30/2009 38263000 
Old Line Bancshares 12/05/2008 7000000 07/15/2009 7000000 
Old National Bancorp 12/12/2008 100000000 03/31/2009 100000000 
Park National Corporation 12/23/2008 100000000 04/25/2012 100000000 
Parke Bancorp 01/30/2009 16288000 11/30/2012 11595735 
Parkvale Financial Corp 12/23/2008 31762000 06/15/2011 31762000 
Pathfinder Bancorp, Inc. 09/11/2009 6771000 09/01/2011 6771000 
Peapack-Gladstone Financial 01/09/2009 28685000 01/06/2010 7172000 
Peoples Bancorp Inc. 01/30/2009 39000000 02/02/2011 21000000 
Peoples Bancorp of North 
Carolina 
12/23/2008 25054000 06/27/2012 23033635 
Pinnacle Financial 12/12/2008 95000000 12/28/2011 23750000 
Plumas Bancorp 01/30/2009 11949000 05/03/2013 11949000 
PNC Financial Services 12/31/2008 7579200000 02/10/2010 7579200000 
Premier Financial Bancorp, Inc. 10/02/2009 22252000 07/27/2012 19849222 
PremierWest Bancorp 02/13/2009 41400000 12/14/2012 41400000 
PrivateBancorp 01/30/2009 243815000 10/24/2012 243815000 
Pulaski Financial Corp 01/16/2009 32538000 06/27/2012 28460338 
QCR Holdings 02/13/2009 38237000 09/15/2011 38237000 
Regions Financial Corp. 11/14/2008 3500000000 04/04/2012 3500000000 
S&T Bancorp 01/16/2009 108676000 12/07/2011 108676000 
Salisbury Bancorp 03/13/2009 8816000 08/25/2011 8816000 
Sandy Spring Bancorp 12/05/2008 83094000 07/21/2010 83094000 
SCBT Financial Corp 01/16/2009 64779000 05/20/2009 64779000 
Severn Bancorp 11/21/2008 23393000 09/25/2013 23367267 
Shore Bancshares 01/09/2009 25000000 04/15/2009 25000000 
Signature Bank 12/12/2008 120000000 03/31/2009 120000000 
Somerset Hills Bancorp 01/16/2009 7414000 05/20/2009 7414000 
Southern Community Financial 12/05/2008 42750000 03/27/2012 42750000 
Southern First Bancshares 02/27/2009 17299000 06/27/2012 15403722 
Southern Missouri Bancorp 12/05/2008 9550000 07/21/2011 9550000 
Southwest Bancorp 12/05/2008 70000000 08/08/2012 70000000 
State Bancorp 12/05/2008 36842000 12/14/2011 36842000 
State Street 10/28/2008 2000000000 06/09/2009 2000000000 
StellarOne Corp 12/19/2008 30000000 04/13/2011 7500000 
Sterling Bancorp 12/23/2008 42000000 04/27/2011 42000000 
Stewardship Financial Corp 01/30/2009 10000000 09/01/2011 10000000 
Summit State Bank 12/19/2008 8500000 08/04/2011 8500000 
Sun Bancorp 
 
01/09/2009 89310000 04/08/2009 89310000 
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Name Disbursed 
Date 
Disbursed 
Amount 
Returned 
Date 
Returned 
Amount 
SunTrust 11/14/2008 4850000000 03/30/2011 4850000000 
Susquehanna Bancshares 12/12/2008 300000000 04/21/2010 200000000 
SVB Financial Group 12/12/2008 235000000 12/23/2009 235000000 
Synovus Financial Corp. 12/19/2008 967870000 07/26/2013 967870000 
Taylor Capital 11/21/2008 104823000 06/13/2012 92254460 
TCF Financial 11/14/2008 361172000 04/22/2009 361172000 
Texas Capital Bancshares 01/16/2009 75000000 05/13/2009 75000000 
The Bancorp 12/12/2008 45220000 03/10/2010 45220000 
The First Bancorp 01/09/2009 25000000 08/24/2011 12500000 
Timberland Bancorp 12/23/2008 16641000 11/13/2012 14412687 
TowneBank 12/12/2008 76458000 09/22/2011 76458000 
Trustmark Corp 11/21/2008 215000000 12/09/2009 215000000 
U.S. Bancorp 11/14/2008 6599000000 06/09/2009 6599000000 
Umpqua 11/14/2008 214181000 02/17/2010 214181000 
Union First Market Bankshares 
Corporation 
12/19/1008 92900000 11/18/2009 59000000 
United Community Banks 12/05/2008 180000000 03/28/2013 171517500 
Unity Bancorp 12/05/2008 20649000 05/15/2013 20649000 
Valley Financial Corp 12/12/2008 16019000 11/14/2012 16019000 
Valley National 11/14/2008 300000000 06/03/2009 300000000 
Virginia Commerce Bancorp 12/12/2008 71000000 12/11/2012 71000000 
VIST Financial Corp 12/19/2008 25000000 01/26/2012 25000000 
Washington Banking Company 01/16/2009 26380000 01/12/2011 26380000 
Washington Federal Inc. 11/14/2008 200000000 05/27/2009 200000000 
Webster Financial 11/21/2008 400000000 03/03/2010 100000000 
Wells Fargo 10/28/2008 25000000000 12/23/2009 25000000000 
WesBanco 12/05/2008 75000000 09/09/2009 75000000 
West Bancorporation 12/31/2008 36000000 06/29/2011 36000000 
Westamerica Bancorporation 02/13/2009 83726000 09/02/1009 83726000 
Western Alliance 
Bancorporation 
11/21/2008 140000000 09/27/2011 140000000 
Wilshire Bancorp 12/12/2008 62158000 03/28/2012 57766994 
Wintrust Financial Corp 12/19/2008 250000000 12/22/2010 250000000 
WSFS Financial 01/23/2009 52625000 03/28/2012 47435299 
Yadkin Valley Financial Corp 01/16/2009 49312000 09/12/2012 43486820 
Zions Bancorp 11/14/2008 1400000000 03/28/2012 700000000 
Source: http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list/category/Bank 
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Table 2. Definition of Variables Used to Analyze Bank Performance 
This table lists the ratio names and definitions used to examine bank performance during the 
period from 2008Q4 to 2013Q4. Quarterly data are obtained from Compustat data base based on 
banks ticker. For each observation, pre-event quarterly data is employed. 
1 Return on assets Net income after tax divided by total assets 
2 Tier 1 capital ratio Risk-adjusted tier 1 capital divided by total assets 
3 Liquidity ratio Cash and short-term investment divided by total assets 
4 Net-charge offs to total assets The reported amount of asset write-downs minus 
recoveries of previous write downs and then divided 
by total assets 
5 Nonperforming asset to total 
assets 
loans and other assets that are 90 days or greater past 
due divided by total assets 
6 Provisions for loan to total asset Charged against earnings to establish a reserve 
sufficient to 
  absorb expected loan losses based upon knowledge of 
the loan portfolio divided by total assets 
7 Common share issued to total 
assets 
Common share issued divided by total assets 
8 Repayment amount to total 
assets 
Repayment amount for each event window divided by 
total assets 
9 Merger Dummy variable equals to one if the bank was merged 
otherwise zero 
10 lnassets the natural logarithm of total assets 
  
 31  
 
 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of selected control variables for “one-time-only-banks” 
which are banks with one repayment and for “multiple-times-banks” which are banks with 
multiple repayments. The last column reports the difference in mean between the two groups. ***, 
**, and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
raw variable 
($ million) 
mean median s.deviation Maximum Minimum T-test in 
mean (P 
value) 
Total assets       
"one-time-only-
banks" 
55001.39 2214.31 262168.50 2251043.00 284.18 -0.68 
"multiple-times-
banks" 
99168.03 2583.28 410.392.30 1888599.00 349.73 (0.50) 
lnassets       
"one-time-only-
banks" 
8.16 7.70 1.80 14.63 5.65 -0.44 
"multiple-times-
banks" 
8.35 7.86 1.99 5.86 14.45 (0.66) 
Ratio variable 
(%) 
mean median s.deviation Maximum Minimum T-test in 
mean (P 
value) 
Return on assets 
(ROA) 
      
"one-time-only-
banks" 
0.17 0.17 0.41 3.14 -2.11 -0.25 
"multiple-times-
banks" 
0.19 0.17 0.18 0.70 -0.08 (0.80) 
Tier 1 capital 
ratio 
      
"one-time-only-
banks" 
13.80 13.46 3.37 31.13 6.99 -0.68 
"multiple-times-
banks" 
14.30 14.40 2.02 17.69 9.76 (0.50) 
Liquidity ratio       
"one-time-only-
banks" 
6.65 5.01 5.96 38.10 0.71 0.43 
"multiple-times-
banks" 
6.03 4.23 5.89 26.00 1.02 (0.67) 
Net-charge offs 
to total assets 
      
"one-time-only-
banks" 
-0.17 -0.14 0.18 0.18 -1.27 -0.25 
"multiple-times-
banks" 
-0.16 -0.13 0.12 0 -0.40 (0.80) 
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Ratio variable 
(%) 
mean median s.deviation Maximum Minimum T-test in 
mean (P 
value) 
 
Nonperforming 
asset to total 
assets 
      
"one-time-only-
banks" 
2.57 1.98 2.42 20.52 0.00 1.50 
"multiple-times-
banks" 
1.79 1.80 1.18 6.06 0.00 (0.13) 
Provisions for 
loan to total 
assets 
      
"one-time-only-
banks" 
0.16 0.12 0.18 1.26 -0.22 0.01 
"multiple-times-
banks" 
0.16 0.16 0.13 0.40 0.00 (0.99) 
Common share 
issued to total 
assets 
      
"one-time-only-
banks" 
0.82 0.71 0.51 3.45 0.08 0.80 
"multiple-times-
banks" 
0.73 0.71 0.31 1.22 0.18 (0.43) 
Repayment 
amount to total 
assets 
      
"one-time-only-
banks" 
92.72 1.66 688.56 8797.15 0.00 0.58 
"multiple-times-
banks" 
5.24 1.78 8.91 38.14 0.00 (0.56) 
Dummy variable mean median s.deviation Maximum Minimum T-test in 
mean (P 
value) 
Merger       
"one-time-only-
banks" 
0.11 0.00 0.32 1.00 0.00 0.93 
"multiple-times-
banks" 
0.05 0.00 0.22 1.00 0.00 (0.35) 
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of CAR 
This table reports the descriptive Statistics cumulative abnormal return during three-day window 
(-1, 1) on each event date using the market model for each of “one-time-only-banks” which are 
banks with one repayment and for each of “multiple-times-banks” which are banks with multiple 
repayments.  Benchmark period is the previous quarter from the event date and only actively 
involved in TARP companies are included in the sample. The last column reports the difference 
in mean between the two groups. ***, **, and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
confidence level, respectively. 
variable mean media
n 
s.deviation Maximum Minimu
m 
T-test for 
CAR (p-value) 
CAR       
"one-time-
only-banks" 
0.0160*** 0.0034 0.0012 0.2630 -0.0298 13.2426 
(0.0000) 
 
"multiple-
times-banks" 
0.0023 0.0002 0.0037 0.0544 -0.0302 0.6190 
(0.5429) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 34  
 
 
Table 5 Event Study Results 
This table reports the comparison analysis results of average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) 
during three-day window (-1, 1) for the entire group of “one-time-only-banks” which are banks 
with one repayment and for the entire group of “multiple-times-banks” which are banks with 
multiple repayments. The market model is used to estimation. The results of average cumulative 
abnormal return (ACAR) split by the median level of financial controlled variables (Return on 
assets, Tier 1 capital ratio, Liquidity ratio, Net-charge offs to total assets, Nonperforming asset to 
total assets, Provisions for loan to total asset, Common share issued to total assets, Repayment 
amount to total assets), the five size level of Total assets and two true or false level of one dummy 
(Merger) in the previous quarter. Benchmark period is the previous quarter from the event date 
and only actively involved in TARP companies are included in the sample. I use t-test to test 
whether average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) is significantly different to zero. ***, **, 
and * indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
 one-time-only-banks  Multiple-times-banks  
variables ACAR  ACAR  
total asset(million)     
<500 0.0223 ** -0.0061  
 (0.0066)  (0.0055)  
500-1000 0.0222 *** 0.0024  
 (0.0035)  (0.0069)  
1000-3000 0.0186 *** 0.0087  
 (0.0020)  (0.0083)  
3000-10000 0.0178 *** 0.0144  
 (0.0018)  (0.150)  
>10000 0.0015 *** 0.0209  
 (0.0028)  
 
(0.0118)  
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 one-time-only-banks  Multiple-times-banks  
variables ACAR  ACAR  
Return on assets    
<=median 0.0233 *** -0.0038 
 (0.0018)  (0.0051) 
>median 0.0087 *** 0.0089  
 (0.0016)  (0.0052)  
Repayment amount to total 
assets 
    
<=median 0.0193 *** 0.0045  
 (0.0018)  (0.0047)  
>median 0.0127 *** -0.0002  
 (0.0017)  (0.0057)  
merger     
independence 0.0082 *** 0.0023  
 (0.0012)  (0.0036)  
merger 0.0767 *** 0.0015  
 (0.0045)  (0.0269)  
Common share issued to 
total assets 
    
<=median 0.0192 *** 0.0057  
 (0.0016)  (0.0065)  
>median 0.0130 *** -0.0008  
 (0.0018)  (0.0037)  
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 one-time-only-banks  Multiple-times-banks  
variables ACAR  ACAR  
Provisions for loan to total 
asset 
    
<=median 0.0130 *** 0.0058  
 (0.0016)  (0.0057)  
>median 0.0192 *** 0.0010  
 (0.0018)  (0.0047)  
Net-charge offs to total 
assets 
    
<=median 0.0149 *** 0.0033  
 (0.0017)  (0.0045)  
>median 0.0172 *** 0.0012  
 (0.0017)  (0.0058)  
Nonperforming asset to total 
assets 
    
<=median 0.0158 *** 0.0037  
 (0.0016)  (0.0048)  
>median 0.0163 *** 0.0009  
 (0.0018)  (0.0054)  
Liquidity ratio     
<=median 0.0148 *** -0.0004  
 (0.0017)  (0.0064)  
>median 0.0173 *** 0.0047  
 (0.0018)  (0.0039)  
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 one-time-only-banks  Multiple-times-banks  
variables ACAR  ACAR  
Tier 1 capital ratio     
<=median 0.0269 *** -0.0065  
 (0.0019)  (0.0057)  
>median 0.0051 *** 0.0119  
 (0.0016)  (0.0044) ** 
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Table 6 Regression Results 
This table reports the result of cross-sectional regression for “one-time-only-banks” which are 
banks with one repayment and for “multiple-times-banks” which are banks with multiple 
repayments. In this table, cumulative abnormal return for each bank is used as a dependent 
variable. Average cumulative abnormal returns are estimated by using market model during a 
three-day window (-1, 1) on each event date. Benchmark period is the previous one year from the 
event date and only actively involved in TARP companies are included in the sample. ***,**, and 
* indicate the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level, respectively. 
Variables One-time-only Multiple-times 
lnassets -0.0007 0.0098 
 (0.0022) (0.0035) 
Return on assets (ROA) -1.6823** 10.8133*** 
 (0.8576) (2.4324) 
Tier 1 capital ratio -0.0016 0.0018 
 (0.0010) (0.0019) 
Liquidity ratio -0.0580 0.2651 
 (0.0560) (0.1315) 
Net-charge offs to total assets 4.4689 -0.4817 
 (2.8466) (6.5857) 
Nonperforming asset to total assets 0.0450 -0.2547 
 (0.1442) (0.4846) 
Provisions for loan to total asset 0.7907 -1.4657 
 (3.1473) (6.4255) 
Common share issued to total assets -0.5350 -2.5665 
 (0.6468) (1.4124) 
Repayment amount to total assets -0.0002 -0.2654 
 (0.0005) (0.0588) 
Merger  0.0660*** -0.0068 
 (0.0103) (0.0176) 
Number of obs 175 21 
F statistics 6.20 3.92 
Prob > F 0.00 0.0210 
R-squared 0.27 0.7966 
Adj R-squared 0.23 0.5932 
Root MSE 0.04 0.0140 
 
  
 39  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 40  
 
 
Figure 1 Distribution of TARP Issuance Frequency by Quarter 
 
 
 
            
Figure 2 Distribution of TARP Issuance Amount by Quarter 
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Figure 3 Distribution of TARP Repayment Frequency by Quarter 
 
 
 
Figures 4 Distribution of TARP Repayment Amount by Quarter 
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